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1. Introduction 
 
 Corporate capital structure remains a controversial issue in modern corporate finance.  
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a plethora of research has been 
undertaken in attempting to identify the determinants of capital structure. Considerably less 
research has been undertaken in identifying if different types of corporations vary in their 
capital structure and their capital structure determinants. This is particularly the case for 
multinational corporations (MNCs) versus domestic corporations (DCs).  
 Theoretically, it is often argued that the international diversification of earnings 
should enable MNCs to sustain a higher level of debt than DCs, without increasing their 
default risk. Fatemi (1988), Lee and Kwok (1988), Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997),  
Homaifer, Zietz and Benkato (1998), Chkir and Cosset (2001) and Doukas and Pantzalis 
(2003) investigated capital structures between US based MNCs and DCs and all reported US 
MNCs as having less leverage than US DCs. This suggests that the effect of higher agency 
costs of debt for MNCs, as a result of capital and labor market imperfections, complexity of 
international operations and higher proportion of intangible assets, exceeds the possible 
benefits of international diversification and leads to lower debt ratios for MNCs (Chkir and 
Cosset, 2001). However, Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004) find that international 
diversification is positively associated with higher leverage for a sample of French 
corporations and Mittoo and Zhang (2005) find Canadian MNCs to have higher leverage 
relative to Canadian DCs.   
 The inconsistency in evidence between US, French and Canadian studies warrants 
further investigation from other countries. We are therefore motivated to look for evidence 
in Japan. Japan is of interest for several reasons. First, existing studies rely primarily on the 
US evidence. The robustness of the US findings needs to be examined against evidence from 
other major industrialized countries such as Japan. Second, Japanese MNCs control 
substantial amounts of wealth and Japanese multinational corporations represent some of the 
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largest corporations worldwide. Understanding the determinants of capital structure for both 
multinational and domestic corporations is important given the amount of wealth involved.  
Third, Japan has a unique corporate system with control mechanisms different from the US 
(He and Ng, 1998). How this different system impacts on the determinants of capital 
structure between MNC and DCs will add insight into the debate on capital structure. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet conducted a comprehensive analysis 
of the capital structure determinants of Japanese MNCs.  Thus, Japan makes an interesting 
and attractive candidate for our study. 
 Therefore, we aim to identify the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 
Japanese corporations, to identify if being a Japanese multinational corporation is a 
determinant of capital structure and if the capital structure is different for multinational and 
domestic corporations, what explains the difference.  
 The analyses first considers the significance of standard determinants of capital 
structure over a 10 year period to 2003 for a sample of Japanese domestic and multinational 
corporations. Determinants of capital structure that are considered include age, agency costs, 
bankruptcy risks, business risks, collateral value of assets, free cash flows, foreign exchange 
risks, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields, political risks, profitability and size. A 
dichotomous variable for multinationality is introduced to ascertain if being a multinational 
corporation is a determinant of capital structure. Then interactive dichotomous variables are 
introduced to ascertain the relative importance of being a multinational corporation for the 
determinants of capital structure.  
 On a univariate basis Japanese multinational corporations have significantly less 
leverage than Japanese domestic corporations. Also, they are significantly older, larger, and 
have significantly higher agency costs, business risks, free cash flows, foreign exchange 
risks, growth, non-debt tax shields, political risks and profitability, and they have 
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significantly lower bankruptcy risks and collateral assets than Japanese domestic 
corporations. 
 The multivariate empirical findings show that being a multinational is a significant 
determinant of capital structure and that the determinants of capital structure are different for 
multinational and domestic corporations. Agency costs, business risks, collateral value of 
assets, profitability and size are significant determinants of capital structure for both 
multinational and domestic corporations. Firm age and free cash flows are significant 
determinants of capital structure for domestic corporations but not multinational 
corporations, whereas bankruptcy risks, growth and non-debt tax shields are significant for 
multinationals but not domestic corporations. Foreign exchange risk and political risk is not 
significant for either domestic or multinational corporations, although foreign exchange risk 
is significant in the sample overall. In relation to explanations for the observed difference in 
capital structure between domestic and multinational corporations we find firm age, business 
risks, free cash flows, growth, non-debt tax shields and political risks are significant.  
The paper is divided into four sections.  The next section reviews the relevant 
literature and defines the variables.  The second provides discussion of the method and data 
respectively.  Section three discusses the results and section four summarizes the key 
findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Capital structure determinants and variable definitions 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) are widely regarded as the pioneers in modeling the 
relevance of capital structure to firm value. Since then the debate has progressed from 
theoretical modeling to practical reality. It is recognized that by relaxing the assumptions of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure is relevant to firm value. The variables that 
are generally regarded as determinants of capital structure include age, agency costs, 
bankruptcy risks, business risks, collateral value of assets, foreign exchange risks, free cash 
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flows, growth, non-debt tax shields, political risks, profitability, and size. Generally, these 
variables relate to value and risks of the firm as faced by bondholders, equityholders and 
managers. 
Apart from identifying the determinants of capital structure an important issue is 
defining what is meant by capital structure or leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) provide 
an overview of the different definitions of leverage. In relation to research on the capital 
structure of multinational corporations two main definitions of leverage have been applied. 
Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) and Mittoo and Zhang (2005) amongst others define leverage 
as long-term debt scaled by total debt plus market value of equity. Lee and Kwok (1988), 
Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997) and Chkir and Cosset (2001) amongst others define 
leverage as long-term debt scaled by long-term debt plus market value of equity. To provide 
a benchmark for comparability we use the later definition in our analysis and define leverage 
for firm i  at time t, as: 
,
,
, ,
  
(      )
i t
i t
i t i t
Long term debt
LEVERAGE
Long term debt Market value of equity
= + .
1 
 
2.1. Age 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that leverage decreases with age of the firm. 
Although they cite agency issues as a potential explanation, age of the firm may also proxy 
for lower information asymmetries. As firms grow older more information regarding their 
future viability becomes available. Lower information asymmetries imply higher leverage. 
Bondholders would be more likely to lend to firms they know more about than lending to 
firms they know less about. Therefore, given this conflict we do not hypothesize what effect 
age has on leverage. However, we expect MNCs to be older than DCs since firms are 
                                                 
1 Correlation analysis for our sample indicates over 90% correlation between the two measures. 
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generally likely to begin as domestic corporations and expand over time to become 
multinationals. 
 The variable for firm age is measured following Michaelas, Chittenden and 
Poutziouris (1999) amongst others: 
 AGEi,t = ln (age of  firm i, in years from date of incorporation). 
 
2.2. Agency costs 
 Higher agency costs are expected to result in lower debt levels (Jensen, 1986; 
Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). Significant agency costs arise from the conflict of interest 
between stockholders and bondholders. The consistent message of agency models is that 
these conflicts create incentives for stockholders to take actions that benefit themselves at 
the expense of bondholders. Myers (1977) argues that agency problems are especially 
serious for assets that give the firm the option to undertake growth opportunities in the 
future. The greater the firm’s investment in such assets the less it would be debt financed. 
MNCs agency costs are expected to be higher relative to DCs (Burgman, 1996).  Therefore, 
we expect that MNCs leverage would be lower than DC’s after controlling for all other 
effects. A proxy for agency costs is expenditure on research and development (Myers, 1977). 
Therefore, following Myers (1977) the variable used to proxy for agency costs is: 
 ,,
,
 
 i ti t
i t
Research and Development
AGNCY
Total Sales
= .2 
  
 
2.3. Bankruptcy risks 
 Bankruptcy risk has two components:  
1. Probability of Bankruptcy. 
                                                 
2 Included in this variable is often advertising expense however this was not available for our sample of firms. 
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2. Costs of Bankruptcy (loss of customers, loss of reputation, legal costs etc). 
 Higher levels of debt will increase the probability of bankruptcy and increase 
bankruptcy costs. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between leverage and bankruptcy 
risks. Traditionally, many textbooks have argued theoretically that MNCs should be in a 
better position than their domestic counterparts to support higher debt because their cash 
flows are diversified internationally giving them lower risk of default (Eiteman, Stonehill 
and Moffett, 2001). However, some empirical studies have come to the opposite conclusion 
(Lee and Kwok, 1998; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al. 1997 amongst others). 
 If we proxy bankruptcy risks via a bankruptcy prediction model such as the Altman 
Z-score (Altman, 2000) we expect a negative relation between leverage and the Z-score.3 
Bankruptcy risks for each firm are proxied with Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 2000)4:  
,  1.2(  /     )
1.4(  /  )
3.3 (     /     ) 
0.6(     
i tBCPTY working capital book value of total assets
retained earnings total assets
earnings before interest and tax book value of total assets
market capitalisation of ordinary
= +
+
+
/     )  
 /     .
equity book value of total liabilities
net sales book value of total assets
+
 
2.4. Business risks 
 Business risk refers to the risk associated with the future operations of the business. 
This is the risk that is inherent in the expected net operating income stream generated by the 
assets of the firm (Bishop, Faff, Oliver and Twite, 2004).  A proxy for business risk is the 
equity beta adjusted for leverage or de-geared.  Generally, it is expected that there is an 
inverse relation between leverage and business risk potentially due to the associated increase 
in bankruptcy risks (Burgman, 1996). In relation to MNCs, it is frequently argued that, due 
to their ability to diversify across less than perfectly correlated markets, business risks for 
MNCs should be less than DCs. MNCs should therefore be able to support relatively more 
                                                 
3 We expect a negative relation because the higher the Z-score the lower the probability of bankruptcy. 
 
4 To minimise spurious correlation between our measure of leverage and Altmans’s Z-score the Z-score is 
lagged one period. 
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leverage. However, this has not always been supported empirically. For example, Reeb, 
Kwok and Baek (1998) report that US-based MNCs have higher systematic risk (after 
adjusting for leverage) than US domestic corporations. 
 We proxy business risk as the de-geared equity beta for each firm: 
 ,
,
,
 e  
(1 )
1
L
i t
i t c
i t
BUSRISK De geared quity beta
D t
E
β= − =  −+   
 
where 
βL = OLS regression on previous 52 weeks of returns with the market: 
, , ,( )i w L m w i wR Rα β ε= + +  and Ri,w =ln(Pi,w/Pi,w-1). Where Pi,w is the stock price at week w. 
The market index (Rm,w) used was the Nikkei all stocks total index, and 
Di,t = Book value of total debt at end of year t; 
Ei,t = Market capitalization of ordinary equity at end of year t; and 
tc = Corporate tax rate. 
 
2.5. Collateral value of assets 
 The collateral value of assets, or tangibility of assets, held by a firm has found to be a 
determinant of leverage (Rajan and Zingalis, 1995).  Firms with higher tangible assets are 
expected to have higher leverage.  Tangible assets are likely to have an impact on the 
borrowing decisions of a firm because they are less subject to informational asymmetries and 
usually they have a greater value than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. Additionally, 
the moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as collateral, because 
this constitutes a positive signal to the debt holders.  In relation to MNCs and DCs, it is 
uncertain whether the level of tangible assets is higher or lower for MNCs relative to DCs.  
Following Friend and Lang (1988) we define the collateral value of assets for each 
firm as:  
 
    
 = 
    
i,t
i,t
i,t
Book value of tangible assets
CVA
Book value of total assets
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2.6. Free cash flows 
 Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that excess free cash flow is cash flow 
in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive NPV.  Firms with excess free 
cash flow face conflicts of interest between stockholders and managers.  The problem is how 
to motivate managers to distribute excess funds rather than investing them below the costs of 
capital or on organizational inefficiencies, such as management perks.  Leverage is an 
effective means for addressing the free cash flow problem, because contractual payments of 
interest and principal must be made.  Bondholders can take the firm to bankruptcy if 
managers do not maintain loan repayments.  Accordingly, debt reduces the agency cost of 
free cash flows by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of 
managers (Stulz, 1990 and Harris and Raviv, 1991). Therefore, firms with higher free cash 
flow are expected to have lower leverage, an inverse relation.  In relation to MNCs and DCs, 
it is uncertain whether the level of free cash flow is higher or lower for MNCs relative to 
DCs. 
 We define free cash flow as per Lehn and Poulsen (1989) standardized by the book 
value of total asset as: 
 ,    
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
i t
i,t
EBIT  + DEP  + AMO  - TAX  - DIV  - INT
FCF
Book value of total assets
=      
where: 
EBIT i,t  = earnings before interest and tax and abnormal items; 
DEP i,t  = depreciation expense; 
AMO i,t  = amortization; 
TAX i,t  = total tax paid; 
DIV i,t  = total dividends paid on ordinary and preference shares; and 
INT i,t  = net interest expense; 
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2.7. Foreign exchange risks 
 The more sensitive a firm’s cash flows and earnings are to foreign exchange 
rates, the lower the expected level of debt. Burgman (1996) analyzed the relation between 
foreign exchange risk and corporate financing decisions and reported that foreign exchange 
risk significantly affects financing decisions. Further, exchange rate movements affects both 
the cash flows of a firm’s operations and discount rates employed to value the cash flows 
(Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul, 1996).5 In relation to MNCs, we expect MNCs to have a higher 
exposure to foreign exchange risk than DCs. This implies that MNCs would have relatively 
lower leverage, after controlling for all other variables. However, foreign exchange risk is a 
risk commonly hedged by firms. Although MNCs may have greater exposure to foreign 
exchange risk, the risk may be hedged. Hedging is also available to DCs. Therefore, relative 
to DCs we cannot hypothesize what influence foreign exchange risk will have on capital 
structure of MNCs relative to DCs. 
Foreign exchange risk exposure of each firm is defined as per Wright, Madura and Wiant 
(2002): 
 ,,
,
  
 
 
i t
i t
i t
Total foreign sales
FX
Total sales
=  
2.8. Growth 
 The expected relation between leverage and growth opportunities is not clear. 
The contracting hypothesis suggests that firms with higher growth are expected to have 
lower leverage. This is based on the underinvestment and asset substitution problems that 
debt is supported by assets-in-place rather than growth opportunities (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988 and Gul, 1999).6  On the other hand, the signaling 
                                                 
5 Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996) shows that there is an increase in the variability of equity returns following 
the period of increased exchange-rate variability.  The results suggest that the increase in exchange-rate 
fluctuations is an indication of an increase in the riskiness of cash flows. 
 
6 The underinvestment problem refers to the tendency of managers to reject positive NPV projects in which the 
value increase goes to bondholders rather than equityholders.  This suggests that firms will issue debt when 
they have assets-in-place rather than when they have growth opportunities.  Therefore, firms with higher 
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hypothesis is based on the impact of information asymmetries on debt policies. For example, 
firms with higher growth opportunities face greater information disparities and therefore are 
expected to have higher debt levels to signal higher quality (Gul, 1999).  This follows the 
default probability theory of Merton (1974) which also implies a positive relation between 
growth and leverage (Nishioka and Baba, 2004). Given this conflict we do not hypothesize 
the relation between leverage and growth. Similarly, we do not hypothesize whether growth 
is higher or lower for MNCs relative to DCs and the impact this has on MNCs capital 
structure.  
Growth is defined by following Wald (1999), based on Myers (1977) 
underinvestment arguments of growth opportunity related agency costs: 
 ,  %          4 i tGROW Average change in book value of total assets over past years= . 
 
2.9. Non-debt tax shields 
 Taxation and its relation to capital structure are explicitly linked to the applicable tax 
regime. Under the Japanese classical tax system the tax deductibility of interest is expected 
to induce a preference for debt.  De Angelo and Masulis (1980) formalized a framework 
whereby tax deductions that are not associated with debt act as substitutes for interest 
deductions.  These non-debt tax shields compete with interest as a tax deduction.  Firms with 
higher non-debt tax shields are expected to have lower leverage, as the tax benefits of 
leverage are relatively less valuable.  MNCs should be better equipped than DCs to exploit 
taxation regulation across different countries for the purpose of reducing their tax liabilities. 
However, we make no hypothesis as to the relative difference in non-debt tax shields 
                                                                                                                                                      
growth opportunities are expected to have less leverage. The asset substitution problem refers to the tendency 
of managers to switch from low risk assets to high risk assets to transfer wealth from bondholders to 
equityholders. This is more likely to happen in firms with higher growth opportunities (less assets-in-place) as 
it is easier to switch assets if they are in the form of growth opportunities. Therefore, firms with higher growth 
opportunities are expected to have less leverage. 
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between MNCs and DCs. If MNCs have higher levels of non-debt tax shields we expect 
them to have lower leverage, all other things constant. 
Following Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) we define 
non-debt tax shield as:   
 
   
  
    
i,t
i,t
i,t
Total annual depreciation expense
NDTS
Book value of total assets
=   
 
2.10. Political risks 
 Political risk is the chance that political events will have an adverse effect on the 
operations of the firm. Political risks include expropriation of assets, trade controls, 
institutional ineffectiveness, threat of war, social unrest, disorderly transfers of power, 
political violence, international disputes, regime changes and regulatory restrictions (Jodice, 
1985).  Firms that face higher political risks are expected to have less leverage due to greater 
probability of misappropriation of assets. MNCs operating overseas subsidiaries are 
expected to have higher political risks than DCs. Therefore, given a negative relation 
between political risk and leverage we expect that MNCs would have less leverage relative 
to DCs after controlling for other variables. 
 Political risk of each firm is measured as follows. Let C be the sample of companies 
and R the set of different countries that companies in the sample operate from. Let Ic,r be the 
revenue of company c coming from a particular country, r. The sum of revenues for 
company c, from different countries is the sum of Ic,i.   Pc,r is the proportion of revenue from 
a particular country relative to the total revenue of company c. Notationally, this is as 
follows: 
 
∑
∈
=
Ri
ic
rc
rc I
I
P
,
,
,
. 
For each country in which a company operates a political risk rating is obtained from 
the PRS group Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis (Howell, 2005). This is 
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denoted as lambda (λi).  The political risk rating is then multiplied by the proportion of 
revenue from that particular country relative to the total revenue of the company. This 
provides a measure of political risk faced by the firm.  The maximum value of this political 
risk rating variable is 100. This indicates the lowest level of political risk.  A minimum value 
of zero indicates the riskiest political risk rating. To ease interpretation we subtract the rating 
(γc) from 100 to end up with the most risk as 100 and the least risk as zero. In notation this is 
as follows: 
 
,
, ,
,
=100- 100 100
i c i
i R
i t c i c i
i R c i
i R
I
POLR P
I
∈
∈
∈
λ
γ = − λ = −
∑∑ ∑ .              
 
2.11. Profitability 
 Myers (1984) pecking order theory of capital structure shows that if a firm is 
profitable then it is more likely that financing would be from internal sources rather than 
external sources. More profitable firms are expected to hold less debt, since it is easier and 
more cost effective to finance internally.  MNCs have better opportunities than DCs to earn 
more profit mainly due to having access to more than one source of earnings and better 
chances to have favorable business conditions in particular countries (Kogut, 1985 and 
Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  Consequently, MNCs being more profitable than DCs are 
expected to have lower leverage than DCs after controlling for the other variables. 
The variable chosen to measure profitability for each firm follows Doukas and 
Pantzalis (2003): 
 ,         4 .i tPROF Average net income to total sales for past years=    
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2.12. Size 
 Firm size has been found to be a positive determinant of capital structure (Agrawal 
and Nagarajan, 1990).  Firm size may be a proxy for numerous variables such as lower 
transaction costs in issuing debt, greater access to debt markets and lower information 
asymmetries.  In relation to MNCs and DCs, it is expected that MNCs are larger than DCs. 
Therefore, we expect that MNC would carry higher debt levels relative to DCs, after 
controlling for all other variables. 
 The natural logarithm of total assets is commonly considered a proxy for the size of 
each firm: 
 , (     )i t i,tSIZE Ln Book value of total assets= . 
 In summary, although many determinants of capital structure can be explained for 
firms generally, the different impact they may have on capital structure between MNCs and 
DCs is often unclear.  
 
3. Method and Data 
3.1. Method 
A pooled cross-sectional time series regression model (Model 1) is used to analyze 
capital structure determinants: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 ,
11 , 12 , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
LEVERAGE AGE AGNCY BCPTY BUSRISK
CVA FCF FX GROW NDTS POLR
PROF SIZE
α β β β β
β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + +
 (1) 
The variables are as previously defined. 
 
 Model 1 will be estimated using the full sample of both Japanese MNCs and DCs and 
then separately for MNCs and DCs. This will provide evidence of the significance of the 
determinants of capital structure for Japanese firms generally and then MNCs and DCs. 
 To assess the significance of multinationality in explaining capital structure, a 
dichotomous variable for multinationality will be augmented into Model 1 using the full 
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sample and a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test will be conducted. The LR test enables us to 
determine whether multinationality makes a significant contribution to explaining variation 
in leverage. 
 Model 2 is relevant for identifying the significance of capital structure determinants 
for MNCs relative to DCs. It is a pooled cross-sectional time series regression model with a 
dichotomous variable and dichotomous interaction variables for multinationality: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ,
13 14 , 15 , 16( * ) ( * ) ( *
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i i t i i t i
LEVERAGE AGE AGNCY BCPTY BUSRISK CVA FCF
FX GROW NDTS POLR PROF SIZE
MULT MULT AGE MULT AGNCY MULT BCPTY
α β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + ,
17 18 , 19 ,
20 , 21 , 22 ,
23 , 24 , 25 , ,
)
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
i t
i i i t i i t
i i t i i t i i t
i i t i i t i i t i t
MULT BUSRISK MULT CVA MULT FCF
MULT FX MULT GROW MULT NDTS
MULT POLR MULT PROF MULT SIZE
β β β
β β β
β β β ε
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + +
  (2) 
where  
 MULTi  = a dichotomous variable equal to unity if firm i, is a MNC and zero 
otherwise; and the other variables are as previously defined. 
 The purpose of the interaction dichotomous variables (MULTi) is to allow the 
significance of the determinants of leverage for MNCs relative to DCs to be determined. In 
other words, if any of the coefficients β14 through β25 are significant then the associated 
variable is significantly explaining differences in capital structure between MNCs and DCs.7  
An LR test will be conducted to ascertain the significance of augmenting the dichotomous 
variable into Model 2 as a separate independent variable. Appropriate adjustments for 
heteroscedasticity will be made using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors and covariance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The magnitude each variable has on explaining leverage for MNCs is the sum of both coefficients. For 
example the relation size of MNC has on explaining leverage consists of summing β12 and  β25. 
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3.2. Data 
Three hundred and sixty Japanese corporations that existed over the period 1994 to 
2003 were initially randomly selected from the Osiris database. If a firm reported having at 
least one overseas subsidiary in 2003 and reported foreign sales in any year it was coded as a 
multinational corporation.8 Of the 360 firms, 209 were coded as multinational corporations 
and 147 were coded as domestic corporations. 
 
4. Results 
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the regression models. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 provides some surprising results. Characteristics of MNCs and DCs differ 
significantly on all variables. In relation to leverage, Japanese MNCs have significantly less 
leverage than Japanese DCs. In regards to the independent variables MNCs are on average 
approximately 11 years older than DCs.9 The proxy for agency costs are approximately 
twice as high for MNCs than DCs, indicating that MNCs invest significantly more in 
research and development than DCs. Altman Z-score (lagged one period), as a proxy for 
bankruptcy risks, is significantly higher for MNCs relative to DCs indicating that MNCs 
have a lower probability of bankruptcy. Business risk, as proxied by de-geared equity beta, is 
significantly higher for MNCs than DCs. Collateral value of assets is significantly higher for 
DCs than MNCs, indicating that Japanese domestic corporations have relatively higher 
levels of tangible assets than their MNC counterparts. MNCs have significantly higher levels 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
8 Different studies have used different definitions of multinationality. Information on Osiris for the number of 
overseas subsidiaries was only available in 2003. We do not consider this a significant problem as anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number of overseas subsidiaries remains relatively constant over time.  MNCs had 
foreign sales on average in five of the 10 years and DCs had foreign sales on average in one of the 10 years. 
 
9 e4.14= 63 years and e3.95= 52 years. 
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of free cash flows indicating greater potential conflicts of interest between stockholders and 
managers. 
MNCs on average have approximately 20% of sales in foreign currency. This 
compares to only a little over 3% for domestic corporations. Although this may translate to 
potential foreign exchange risk, the foreign currency exposures may be hedged and the risks 
transferred.  
MNCs have significantly higher growth opportunities than DCs and also significantly 
higher non-debt tax shields. Political risk faced by Japanese MNCs is significantly higher 
than those faced by DCs. MNCs are also significantly more profitable and significantly 
larger than DCs.  
 In summary, the results are generally similar to many US studies. Particularly 
important is our finding that Japanese MNCs have significantly less leverage than Japanese 
DCs. However, Japanese multinational corporations are very different from domestic 
corporations on all the twelve determinants of capital structure. 
Table 2 provides regression results for Model 1. Significant F-statistics and adjusted 
R2 in excess of 50% across all three regressions suggests that the model fits well statistically. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
The results show that age is a significant variable in explaining leverage for the full 
sample of Japanese firms and for domestic firms. Firms that are older generally have higher 
leverage except if the firm is a multinational. Age is not a significant determinant of capital 
structure for multinationals even though MNCs are significantly older than DCs. 
The proxy for agency costs is negative and significant across all three regressions 
indicating that firms with higher agency costs have lower leverage. This is as we expected.   
The bankruptcy variable is significantly negative for the full sample indicating that 
the higher the bankruptcy measure, the lower the leverage. This is as expected as the higher 
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the Altman Z-score the lower the probability of bankruptcy. This is similarly the case for 
MNCs. However, bankruptcy risk does not show up as a significant determinant of leverage 
for DCs. This is a somewhat surprising result and not as we expected. 
Business risk is negative and significant across all three regressions indicating that 
firms with higher business risk (as proxied by the de-geared beta) have less leverage, this is 
as we expected.  
Collateral value of assets is positive and significant across all three regressions. This 
indicates that firms with higher levels of tangible assets have higher leverage, again this is as 
we expected. The free cash flow variable is insignificant in the full sample and for MNCs 
but is significant for DCs. This is contrary to our expectations. However, it is negative across 
all regressions as we hypothesized.  
The foreign exchange risk variable is negative and significant for the full sample. 
However, when the sample is divided into DCs and MNCs foreign exchange risk is not a 
significant determinant of leverage for either type of corporation.  
The growth variable is negative and significant for only MNCs. Similarly, non-debt 
tax shields are only significant for MNCs.  Political risk is not a significant explanatory 
variable of leverage in the sample of Japanese corporations or for MNCs and DCs 
separately.   
More profitable firms have significantly less leverage regardless of whether they are 
MNCs or DCs. This supports the pecking-order theory of capital structure for both MNCs 
and DCs.  Larger firms have a significantly higher leverage as hypothesized irrespective of 
whether they are MNCs or DCs. 
Generally, the results of Model 1 on the full sample support many of the standard 
theoretical determinants of capital structure. When the sample is divided into MNCs and 
DCs significant differences in the determinants appear.  Although the results of Model 1 
show that the determinants of capital structure differ depending upon whether the firm is a 
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domestic or multinational corporation, the results of Model 1 do not show what explains the 
difference in leverage between MNCs and DCs or even if being a multinational is a 
significant explanatory variable for capital structure.  
To assess the impact of multinationality, the dichotomous variable for 
multinationality (MULTi) was introduced into Model 1. A LR test was performed to assess 
the significance of this variable. The results indicate that multinationality is a significant 
variable in capital structure determination (LR F-stat=8.24; prob=0.004; co-efficient=-0.04; 
t-stat=-2.75; prob-value=0.006). The negative sign on the coefficient indicates that MNCs 
have significantly lower leverage than DCs, confirming the univariate results on leverage 
(see Table 1). To help explain the difference in leverage between MNCs and DCs and to 
assess the impact of individual economic determinants on multinational corporations Model 
2 was estimated. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
The results of Model 2 are shown in Table 3. The adjusted R-squared is 53% and the 
regression is highly significant (F-stat=36.28; prob-value=0.00).  The dichotomous variable 
for multinationality is insignificant. Furthermore, the LR test indicated insignificance for this 
variable in explaining variation in leverage (LR F-stat=2.25; prob=0.13). Therefore, the 
interacting dichotomous variables are adequately capturing differences in the economic 
determinants of capital structure for MNCs and DCs.10  
The results of Model 2 show that age is a significant positive variable in explaining 
capital structure for DCs (confirming results of Model 1). Although age is not a significant 
determinant of leverage for MNCs (Model 1) it is significantly less important in explaining 
differences in leverage between DCs and MNCs.  A reason for this result is that even though 
                                                 
10 Running the regression without the dichotomous variable for multinationality did not change the significance 
of any of the remaining variables. 
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MNCs are significantly older than DCs, once firms are in a mature phase of their life being 
older is less important in explaining capital structure.   
The insignificant interaction variable on agency costs implies that agency costs do 
not explain differences in leverage between MNCs and DCs. This is contrary to our 
expectation that higher agency costs for MNCs relative to DCs would result in lower 
leverage for MNCs. However, as shown in Table 2 agency costs are a significant 
explanatory variable for both MNCs and DCs.  
Although the bankruptcy variable is significant in the full sample and for MNCs 
(Table 2), when the impact of multinationality is isolated it becomes insignificant and 
bankruptcy does not significantly explain differences in leverage between MNCs and DCs.  
The interaction variable for business risk is positive and significant. Although 
business risk is a significant determinant of capital structure for both MNCs and DCs (as 
shown in Table 2), the higher business risk faced by MNCs is significantly less important in 
explaining differences in the capital structure between MNCs and DCs. 
The level of collateral assets is positive and significant in explaining capital structure 
for both MNCs and DCs (Table 2), it is not a significant variable in explaining differences in 
capital structure between the two types of organisations. Although MNCs have significantly 
lower levels of collateral assets than DCs, this does not help in any significant way to 
explain differences between MNCs and DCs capital structures. 
MNCs have significantly higher free cash flow than DCs (Table 1), this higher free 
cash flow is not a significant determinant of MNCs capital structure (Table 2) but the higher 
free cash flow is significant in explaining differences in capital structure between MNCs and 
DCs (Table 3). 
Although foreign exchange risk is significant in explaining capital structure for 
Japanese firms generally the significance of this variable diminishes when multinationality is 
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isolated in the sample (Table 2). This insignificance remains the case in explaining 
differences in capital structure between MNCs and DCs (Table 3). 
The growth variable is significant in explaining the capital structure for MNCs 
(Table 2) and the higher growth of MNCs (Table 1) is significant in explaining differences in 
leverage between MNCs and DCs (Table 3). 
Non-debt tax shields are not significant in explaining capital structure for DCs but 
are significant in explaining capital structure for MNCs (Table 2).  Non-debt tax shields are 
significant in explaining differences in capital structure between the two types of 
organizations (Table 3). MNCs may be better able to utilize non-debt tax shields than DCs, 
as we expected. 
Although political risk is significantly higher for MNCs (Table 1) it is not a 
significant explanatory variable for capital structure (Table 2). However, difference in 
political risk faced by MNCs and DCs is a significant variable in explaining differences in 
capital structure between them. It is significantly less important in explaining leverage for 
MNCs relative to DCs. 
The impact of profitability and size are not significant in explaining differences in 
capital structure for multinational corporations and domestic corporations in the sample of 
Japanese firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper documents the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 360 Japanese 
multinational and domestic corporations over a 10-year period to 2003. We report that 
Japanese multinational have significantly less leverage than Japanese domestic corporations. 
We also report that Japanese multinational corporations are significantly older, larger and 
have significantly higher agency costs, business risks, free cash flows, foreign exchange 
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risks, growth, non-debt tax shields, political risks and profitability and significantly lower 
bankruptcy risks and collateral assets than Japanese domestic corporations. 
 Being a multinational corporation in Japan is significant in explaining capital 
structure for firms generally. In addition, the economic determinants of capital structure are 
not consistent for domestic and multinational corporations. We find that economic 
determinants of capital structure for Japanese domestic corporations include firm age, 
agency costs, business risks, collateral value of assets, free cash flow, profitability and size. 
 For multinational corporations the economic determinants of leverage are agency 
costs, bankruptcy risks, business risks, collateral value of assets, growth, non-debt tax 
shields, profitability and size.  We find firm age, business risks, free cash flows, growth,  
non-debt tax shields, political risks and profitability are the significant variables that explain 
the difference in leverage between the sample of domestic and multinational corporations in 
Japan.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of sample variables 
This table reports variable descriptive statistics of the sample variables for 360 Japanese multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and domestic corporations (DCs) over 10 years to 2003.  Results of t-tests and 
Wilcoxon/Mann Whitney tests are reported in the final two columns respectively. Summary statistics are mean, 
median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and number of observations for MNCs, DCs, and all firms in 
the sample. LEVERAGE is long-term debt scaled by long-term debt plus market value of equity. Firm age is 
the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. Agency costs is estimated as the 
ratio of research and development expenses to sales. The proxy for bankruptcy risks is estimated as the lagged 
Altman Z-score. The proxy for business risk is estimated as the de-geared beta of ordinary equity. The proxy 
for collateral value of assets is estimated as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. The proxy for free cash 
flow is estimated as earnings before interest and tax adjusted for depreciation, amortization, taxation, dividends 
and interest paid scaled by total assets. The proxy for foreign exchange risk is estimated as the ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales. The proxy for growth opportunities facing the firm is estimated as the average percentage 
change in total assets over the previous four years. The proxy for non-debt tax shields is estimated as total 
annual depreciation expense scaled by total assets. The proxy for political risk faced by the firm is estimated as 
a function of the proportion of revenue from different countries weighted by a political risk factor. The proxy 
for profitability is estimated as the average net income to total sales for the past four years. The proxy for firm 
size is estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
*** indicate significance at 1% level. 
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Variable Mean Median Max Min. Std. Dev. Obs. t-Statistic Wilcoxon/Mann 
Whitney 
LEVERAGE    
MNC  0.26 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.19 1708  
DC 0.32 0.28 0.95 0.00 0.21 1087   
All 0.28 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.20 2795 7.52*** 6.56*** 
Firm age    
MNC 4.15 4.14 5.09 2.20 0.36 2110   
DC 3.95 3.97 4.77 1.79 0.46 1480   
All 4.07 4.06 5.09 1.79 0.41 3590 14.34*** 12.64*** 
Agency costs         
MNC 0.04 0.04 0.28 -0.05 0.02 938   
DC 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.02 400   
All 0.04 0.03 0.28 -0.05 0.02 1338 10.42*** 13.80*** 
Bankruptcy risks          
MNC 2.73 2.15 50.23 -0.08 2.46 1516   
DC 2.29 1.80 41.10 -0.38 2.00 984   
All 2.56 2.00 50.23 -0.38 2.28 2500 3.92*** 8.01*** 
Business risks         
MNC 0.63 0.60 2.25 -0.36 0.36 1181   
DC 0.52 0.43 2.97 -0.23 0.42 1027   
All 0.58 0.52 2.97 -0.36 0.39 2208 6.26*** 8.52*** 
Collateral value of assets         
MNC 0.30 0.29 0.71 0.05 0.12 1780   
DC 0.37 0.34 0.92 0.00 0.19 1162   
All 0.33 0.31 0.92 0.00 0.15 2942 12.88*** 9.89*** 
Free cash flows          
MNC 0.07 0.07 1.09 -0.40 0.05 1632   
DC 0.06 0.06 1.80 -0.28 0.07 1028   
All 0.07 0.07 1.80 -0.40 0.06 2660 2.69*** 6.22*** 
Foreign exchange risks         
MNC 0.21 0.13 1.92 0.00 0.26 1779   
DC 0.03 0.00 2.37 0.00 0.11 1162   
All 0.14 0.00 2.37 0.00 0.23 2941 22.66*** 22.62*** 
Growth         
MNC 0.01 0.01 0.19 -0.37 0.05 1505   
DC 0.00 0.00 0.27 -1.01 0.07 891   
All 0.00 0.01 0.27 -1.01 0.06 2396 3.28*** 3.61*** 
Non-debt tax shields         
MNC 0.04 0.04 0.19 -0.03 0.02 1667   
DC 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.03 1076   
All 0.04 0.03 0.21 -0.03 0.02 2743 5.82*** 8.77*** 
Political risks         
MNC 17.66 17.60 31.49 12.88 3.00 1875   
DC 16.94 15.00 25.57 13.00 3.20 1193   
All 17.38 17.04 31.49 12.88 3.09 3068 3.63*** 7.64*** 
Profitability         
MNC 0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.18 0.03 1335   
DC 0.01 0.01 0.43 -0.18 0.03 734   
All 0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.18 0.03 2069 3.39*** 5.55*** 
Size         
MNC 12.93 12.95 16.85 9.01 1.26 1780   
DC 12.10 11.86 16.90 9.28 1.34 1162   
All 12.60 12.54 16.90 9.01 1.34 2942 15.39*** 15.74*** 
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Table 2 
Capital structure determinants 
This table reports the results of the following pooled cross-sectional time series regression (Model 1) on the full 
sample of 360 Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) and domestic corporations (DCs) over 10 years to 
2003 as well as on the sample of domestic and multinational corporations separately: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 ,
11 , 12 , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
LEVERAGE AGE AGNCY BCPTY BUSRISK CVA
FCF FX GROW NDTS POLR
PROF SIZE
α β β β β β
β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
 
where LEVERAGEi,t is the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. AGEi,t is the 
natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. AGNCYi,t is a proxy for agency 
costs and is estimated as the ratio of research and development expenses to sales. BCPTYi,t is a proxy for 
bankruptcy risks and is estimated as the lagged Altman Z-score. BUSRISKi,t is a proxy for business risk and is 
estimated as the de-geared beta of ordinary equity. CVAi,t is a proxy for collateral value of assets and is 
estimated as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. FCFi,t is a proxy for free cash flow and is estimated as 
earnings before interest and tax adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, taxation, dividends and interest paid 
scaled by total assets. FXi,t is a proxy for foreign exchange risk and is estimated as the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales. GROWi,t is a proxy for growth opportunities facing the firm and is estimated as the average 
percentage change in total assets over the previous four years. NDTSi,t is a proxy for non-debt tax shields and is 
estimated as total annual depreciation expense scaled by total assets. POLRi,t is a proxy for political risk faced 
by the firm and estimated as a function of the proportion of revenue from different countries weighted by a 
political risk factor. PROFi,t is a proxy for profitability and is estimated as the average net income to total sales 
for the past four years. SIZEi,t is a proxy for firm size and is estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
MNCs represent multinational corporations and DCs represent domestic corporations. 
Sample t-statistics are White (1980) adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Variable Full sample MNCs DCs 
 Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficientt-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -0.16 -1.67* -0.13 -1.07 -0.36 -2.27** 
Age 0.04 2.74*** 0.01 0.70 0.08 3.09*** 
Agency costs -0.83 -4.29*** -0.74 -3.61*** -0.59 -1.99** 
Bankruptcy risks -0.03 -3.32*** -0.03 -3.68*** -0.01 -1.16 
Business risks -0.14 -8.05*** -0.09 -4.51*** -0.22 -6.47***
Collateral value of assets 0.31 4.45*** 0.37 3.66*** 0.29 3.34*** 
Free cash flows -0.47 -1.63 -0.23 -0.99 -0.89 -3.07***
Foreign exchange risks -0.05 -2.28** -0.01 -0.44 -0.09 -1.09 
Growth -0.16 -1.56 -0.59 -3.66*** -0.02 -0.24 
Non-debt tax shields -0.50 -0.98 -1.78 -2.85*** 0.76 1.34 
Political risks 0.00 0.66 0.00 -0.88 0.01 1.48 
Profitability -0.56 -2.75*** -0.67 -3.63*** -0.64 -2.06** 
Size 0.03 7.97*** 0.04 6.89*** 0.03 3.51*** 
       
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.50  0.51 0.51  
    F-statistic 67.04***  47.56*** 22.81***  
 
 
 
 28
Table 3 
Interaction effects in capital structure determinants for multinational corporations 
This table reports the results of the following pooled cross-sectional time series regression (Model 2) on the 
sample of 360 Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) and domestic corporations (DCs) over 10 years to 
2003: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ,
13 14 , 15 , 16( * ) ( * ) ( *
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i i t i i t i
LEVERAGE AGE AGNCY BCPTY BUSRISK CVA FCF
FX GROW NDTS POLR PROF SIZE
MULT MULT AGE MULT AGNCY MULT BCPTY
α β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + ,
17 18 , 19 ,
20 , 21 , 22 ,
23 , 24 , 25 , ,
)
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
i t
i i i t i i t
i i t i i t i i t
i i t i i t i i t i t
MULT BUSRISK MULT CVA MULT FCF
MULT FX MULT GROW MULT NDTS
MULT POLR MULT PROF MULT SIZE
β β β
β β β
β β β ε
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + +
  
where LEVERAGEi,t is the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. AGEi,t is the 
natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. AGNCYi,t is a proxy for agency 
costs and is estimated as the ratio of research and development expenses to sales. BCPTYi,t is a proxy for 
bankruptcy risks and is estimated as the lagged Altman Z-score. BUSRISKi,t is a proxy for business risk and is 
estimated as the de-geared beta of ordinary equity. CVAi,t is a proxy for collateral value of assets and is 
estimated as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. FCFi,t is a proxy for free cash flow and is estimated as 
earnings before interest and tax adjusted for depreciation, amortisation, taxation, dividends and interest paid 
scaled by total assets. FXi,t is a proxy for foreign exchange risk and is estimated as the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales. GROWi,t is a proxy for growth opportunities facing the firm and is estimated as the average 
percentage change in total assets over the previous four years. NDTSi,t is a proxy for non-debt tax shields and is 
estimated as total annual depreciation expense scaled by total assets. POLRi,t is a proxy for political risk faced 
by the firm and estimated as a function of the proportion of revenue from different countries weighted by a 
political risk factor. PROFi,t is a proxy for profitability and is estimated as the average net income to total sales 
for the past four years. SIZEi,t is a proxy for firm size and is estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
MULTi is a dichotomous variable for multinationality and equals unity if the firm is a multinational and zero 
otherwise. 
Sample t-statistics are White (1980) adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant -0.36 -2.29** 
Age 0.08 3.12*** 
Agency costs -0.59 -2.01** 
Bankruptcy risks -0.01 -1.17 
Business risks -0.22 -6.52*** 
Collateral value of assets 0.29 3.37*** 
Free cash flows -0.89 -3.09*** 
Foreign exchange risks -0.09 -1.10 
Growth -0.02 -0.25 
Non-debt tax shields 0.76 1.35 
Political risks 0.01 1.49 
Profitability -0.64 -2.08** 
Size 0.03 3.54*** 
Multinationality 0.24 1.20 
Multinationality *Age -0.06 -1.88* 
Multinationality *Agency -0.14 -0.40 
Multinationality *Bankruptcy risks -0.02 -1.63 
Multinationality *Business risks 0.14 3.45*** 
Multinationality *Collateral value of assets 0.07 0.54 
Multinationality *Free cash flow 0.66 1.77* 
Multinationality *Foreign exchange risk 0.08 0.93 
Multinationality *Growth -0.58 -3.30*** 
Multinationality *Non-debt tax shields -2.54 -3.02*** 
Multinationality *Political risks -0.01 -1.73* 
Multinationality *Profitability -0.03 -0.09 
Multinationality *Size 0.01 0.76 
Adjusted R-squared 53.16%  
F-statistic 36.28***  
 
